THE CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS' PARADOX WITH REGARD TO HIS "NEOLITHIC PARADOX." WHEN SCIENTISM HAS PREVENTED HIS REACHING TRUE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT FACTS HE HOWEVER CAREFULLY DESCRIBED.

Renato Cocchi, a neurologist and medical psychologis; a sociologist.

 

Summary.

The so called "Neolithic paradox" that Claude Lévi-Strauss has invoked to justify the "man's mastery of the great arts of civilization - of pottery, weaving, agriculture and the domestication of animals ", by hypothesizing a scientific method then lost in the following thousands of years, is not a paradox at all. The acquisitions were reached with the natural scientific method, never lost and still working and used, at least in the medicine.

A true "paradox" is the fact that an eminent anthropologist, as Lévi-Strauss was, has been misled by scientistic conception for which the only progress of the science is creditable to the Scientific Experimental Method.

Key words: Lévi-Strauss, Claude, The savage mind, Neolithic, paradox, Experimental Scientific Method, Narural Scientific Method, reversebrain, similarity, opposition, cause-and-effect, cognitive mechanisms, mistake, scientism, results.

 

Italian translation

Theoretical and research bases

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The so called "Neolithic paradox" forwarded by the anthropologist Claude Lévi Strauss in his "the Pensée Sauvage" book (Paris, 1962 ) is not a paradox at all, but an error of theoretical framing of data and hypotheses however carefully described. Here, Lévi-Strauss was not able to throw out the scientistic frame which prevents his accepting the existence of an other and more ancient scientific method, which is said "The Natural Scientific Method."

Too clearly supposing of being a different scientific method from the Experimental Scientific Method, he did not arrive the theoretical conclusion about what he had under his eyes. So he "preferred" gets rid of the problem, by naming it as a paradox. Personally, I believe that in nature and in the history don't exist any paradoxes, but, at most, inadequate explanations.

It is better however now apply to the words of the same Lévi-Strauss to point out what surely was an error of his mind, unfortunately "not savage," but darkened by a wrong conviction rather commune. Currently, in the overwhelming majority of the scientists, there is the thought that the only possibility of scientific progress is what comes out the use of the Experimental Scientific Method.

 

The text of Lévi-Strauss.

This is the whole text of reference of Lévi-Strauss, (Am. translation, 1966) that subsequently I shall comment.

"But the fact that modern science dates back only a few centuries raises a problem which ethnologists have not sufficiently pondered. The Neolithic Paradox would be a suitable name for it.

Neolithic, or early historical, man was therefore the heir of a long scientific tradition. However, had he, as well as all his predecessors, been inspired by exactly the same spirit as that of our own time, it would be impossible to understand how he could have come to a halt and how several thousand years of stagnation have intervened between the neolithic revolution and modern science like a level plain between ascents. There is only one solution to the paradox, namely, that there are two distinct modes of scientific thought. These are certainly not a function of different stages of the development of the human mind but rather of two strategic levels at which at which nature is accessible to scientific enquiry: one roughly adapted to that of perception and the imagination: the other at a remove from it.

It is as if the necessary connections which are the object of all science, neolithic or modern, could be arrived at by two different routes, one very close to, and the other more remote from, sensible intuition.

I am not however commending a return to the popular belief (although it has some validity in its own narrow context) according to which magic is a timid and stuttering form of science. One deprives oneself of all means of understanding magical thought if one tries to reduce it to a moment or stage in technical and scientific evolution. Like a shadow moving ahead of its owner it is in a sense complete in itself, and as finished and coherent in its immateriality as the substantial being which it precedes. Magical thought is not to be regarded as a beginning, a rudiment, a sketch, a part of a whole which has not yet materialized. It forms a well-articulated system, and is in this respect independent of that other system which constitutes science, except for the purely formal analogy which brings them together and makes the former a sort of metaphorical expression of the latter. It is therefore better, instead of contrasting magic and science, to compare them as two parallel modes of acquiring knowledge. Their theoretical and practical results differ in value, for it is true that science is more successful than magic from this point of view, although magic foreshadows science in that it is sometimes also successful. Both science and magic however require the same sort of mental operations and they differ not so much in kind as in the different types of phenomena to which they are applied.

These relations are a consequence of the objective conditions in which magic and scientific knowledge appeared. The history of the latter is short enough for us to know a good deal about it. But the fact that modern science dates back only a few centuries raises a problem which ethnologists have not sufficiently pondered.

It was in neolithic times that man's mastery of the great arts of civilization - of pottery, weaving, agriculture and the domestication of animals - became firmly established.

No one today would any longer think of attributing these enormous advances to the fortuitous accumulation of a series of chance discoveries or believe them to have been revealed by the passive perception of certain natural phenomena.

Each of these techniques assumes centuries of active and methodical observation, of bold hypotheses tested by means of endlessly repeated experiments.

Each of these techniques assumes centuries of active and methodical observation, of bold hypotheses tested by means of endedless epeated experiments.

A biologist remarks on the rapidity with which plants from the New World have been acclimatized in the Philippines and adopted and named by the natives. In many cases they seem even to have rediscovered their medicinal uses, uses identical with those traditional in Mexico. Fox's interpretation is this:

Plants with bitter leaves or sterns are commonly used in the Philippines for stomach disorders. If an introduced plant is found to have this characteristic, it will be quickly utilized. The fact that many Philippine groups, such as the Pinatubo Negritos, constantly experiment with plants hastens the process of the recognition of the potential usefulness, as defined by the culture, of the introduced flora (R.B.Fox, pp. 212-13; quoted by Lévi-Strauss).

To transform a weed into a cultivated plant, a wild beast into a domestic animal, to produce, in either of these, nutritious or technologically useful properties which were originally completely absent or could only be guessed at; to make stout, water-tight pottery out of clay which is friable and unstable, liable to pulverize or crack (which, however, is possible only if from a large number of organic and inorganic materials, the one most suitable for refining it is selected, and also the appropriate fuel, the temperature and duration of firing and the effective degree of oxidation); to work out techniques, often long and complex, which permit cultivation without soil or alternatively without water; to change toxic roots or seeds into foodstuffs or again to use their poison for hunting, war or ritual - there is no doubt that all these achievements required a genuinely scientific attitude, sustained and watchful interest and a desire for knowledge for its own sake.

For only a small proportion of observations and experiments (which must be assumed to have been primarily inspired by a desire for knowledge) could have yielded practical and immediately useful results.

There is no need to dwell on the working of bronze and iron and of precious metals or even the simple working of copper ore by hammering which preceded metallurgy by several thousand years, and even at the stage they all demand a very high level of technical proficiency.

Any classification is superior to chaos and even a classification at the level of sensible properties is a step towards rational ordering. It is legitimate, in classifying fruits into relatively heavy and relatively light, to begin by separating the apples from the pears even though shape, colour and taste are unconnected with weight and volume. This is because the larger apples are easier to distinguish from the smaller if the apples are not still mixed with fruit of different features. This example already shows that classification has its advantages even at the level of aesthetic perception.

For the rest, and in spite of the fact there is no necessary connection between sensible qualities and properties, there is very often at least an empirical connection between them, and the generalization of this relation may be rewarding from the theoretical and practical point of view for a very long time even if it has no foundation in reason. Not all poisonous juices are burning or bitter nor is everything which is burning and bitter poisonous. Nevertheless, nature is so constituted that it is more advantageous if thought and action proceed as though this aesthetically satisfying equivalence also corresponded to objective reality. It seems probable, for reasons which are not relevant here, that species possessing some remarkable characteristics, say, of shape, colour or smell give the observer what might be called a 'right pending disproof to postulate that these visible characteristics are the sign of equally singular, but concealed, properties. To treat the relation between the two as itself sensible (regarding a seed in the form of a tooth as a safeguard against snake bites, yellow juices as a cure for bilious troubles, etc.) is of more value provisionally than indifference to any connection. For even a heterogeneous and arbitrary classification preserves the richness and diversity of the collection of facts it makes. The decision that everything must be taken account of facilitates the creation of a 'memory bank'.

It is moreover a fact that particular results, to the achievement of which methods of this kind were able to lead, were essential to enable man to assail nature from a different angle. Myths and rites are far from being, as has often been held, the product of man's 'myth-making faculty', turning its back on reality. Their principal value is indeed to preserve until the present time the remains of methods of observation and reflection which were (and no doubt still are) precisely adapted to discoveries of a certain type: those which nature authorised from the starting point of a speculative organization and exploitation of the sensible world in sensible terms. This science of the concrete was necessarily restricted by its essence to results other than those destined to be achieved by the exact natural sciences but it was no less scientific and its results no less genuine. They were secured ten thousand years earlier and still remain at the basis of our own civilization.

There still exists among ourselves an activity which on the technical plane gives us quite a good understanding of what a science we prefer to call 'prior' rather than 'primitive', could have been on the plane of speculation. This is what is commonly called 'bricolage' in French." (Lévi-Strauss, 1966).

 

The analysis and the discussion of the text.

"But the fact that modern science dates back only a few centuries raises a problem which ethnologists have not sufficiently pondered. The Neolithic Paradox would be a suitable name for it."

Clearly Lévi-Strauss believes, so making a mistake, which the science is only what derives from the application of the Experimental Scientific Method, which Galilean published in 1632. On the other hand the discovery of the planet Jupiter's satellites ("the Medicean planets"), the same Galilean made it with the use of a spyglass (then, with a helped observation), and not surely according to the Experimental Scientific Method. Jupiter's moons are still there, and their discovery was an absolutely scientific result, all verified and confirmed.

Of the rest, even after the launch of the first artificial satellite, the astronomy is nearly all not-experimental, but not for this it is a not-science, and less that is never astrology.

"To transform ..... there is no doubt that all these achievements required a genuinely scientific attitude, sustained and watchful interest and a desire for knowledge for its own sake. For only a small proportion of observations and experiments (which must be assumed to have been primarily inspired by a desire for knowledge) could have yielded practical and immediately useful results."

It exists and it is always existed, even a "Natural Scientific Method" which it is not learnt at school, but is connatural to cognitive mechanisms of human beings. (Cocchi, 2004).

As with a current point of view, corresponding to a rational reflection, it consists in:

1. Observation and description of a phenomenon or group of phenomena.

2. Formulation of an hypothesis to explain the phenomena. In physics, the hypothesis often takes the form of a causal mechanism or a mathematical relation.

3. Use of the hypothesis to predict the existence of other phenomena, or to predict quantitatively the results of new observations.

4. Performance of experimental tests of the predictions by several independent experimenters and properly performed experiments".(AA, 1996).

The first three steps form the Natural Scientific Method. The addition of the fourth step gives the rise of the Experimental Scientific Method.

This latter one is only completion and it can reduce the times of reaching the results, but it is not, as very much they believe, and evidently even Lévi-Strauss believed it, the opposition to some not-scientific thing.

To return to the so called "Neolithic paradox," we are exactly dealing with first three steps over described, which steps were valid in the Neolithic time and are valid even today.

"No one today would any longer think of attributing these enormous advances to the fortuitous accumulation of a series of chance discoveries or believe them to have been revealed by the passive perception of certain natural phenomena.

Each of these techniques assumes centuries of active and methodical observation, of bold hypotheses tested by means of endlessly repeated experiments."

There is only one solution to the paradox, namely, that there at which nature is accessible to scientific enquiry: ..... It is as if the necessary connections which are the object of all science, neolithic or modern, could be arrived at by two different routes, one very close to, and the other more remote from, sensible intuition."

What is more bewilder, and it is a paradox not of the Neolithic, but of the same Lévi-Strauss, it is he hypothesized the possibility of another Scientific Method. At the end he denied it because it would belong only to the "sensible intuition," to the not-rational, and then it would have not any dignity of science.

"Neolithic, or early historical, man was therefore the heir of a long scientific tradition. However, had he, as well as all. his predecessors, been inspired by exactly the same spirit as that of our own time, it would be impossible to understand how he could have come to a halt and how several thousand years of stagnation have intervened between the neolithic revolution and modern science like a level plain between ascents?"

Then, in the Neolithic there was another Scientific Method, which then has been lost. This discourse is full absurdly. There has not been any "stop" and less that never "stagnation millenniums." New acquisitions have been done exactly with the same method set in action from the Neolithic man, a method that still works and it is useful.

Then no any "dark millenniums," as the Middle Age does not encompass the so called "dark centuries."

The scientific acquisitions occurred in the Neolithic, those "of pottery, weaving, agriculture and the domestication of animals" have not perhaps needed so many time, and the same Lévi-Strauss contradicts himself.

 

 

"A biologist remarks on the rapidity with which plants from the New World have been acclimatized in the Philippines and adopted and named by the natives. In many cases they seem even to have rediscovered their medicinal uses, uses identical with those traditional in Mexico. Fox's interpretation is this:

Plants with bitter leaves or sterns are commonly used in the Philippines for stomach disorders. If an introduced plant is found to have this characteristic, it will be quickly utilized. The fact that many Philippine groups, such as the Pinatubo Negritos, constantly experiment with plants hastens the process of the recognition of the potential usefulness, as defined by the culture, of the introduced flora (R.B.Fox, pp. 212-13)." (quoted by Lévi-Strauss).

The experience here described, and reported by the same Lévi-Strauss, has not certainly required "centuries and centuries" to reach these results. Would we exaggerate about it? At its highest, it needed three-four centuries, even if they can be even much less.

"This science of the concrete was necessarily restricted by its essence to results other than those destined to be achieved by the exact natural sciences but it was no less scientific and its results no less genuine. They were secured ten thousand years earlier and still remain at the basis of our own civilization."

All quite correct, but to believe that then this ability was missed.

 

"There is only one solution to the paradox [The Neolithic scientificity, then lost] , namely, that there are two distinct modes of scientific thought. These are certainly not a function of different stages of the development of the human mind but rather of two strategic levels at which at which nature is accessible to scientific enquiry: one roughly adapted to that of perception and the imagination: the other at a remove from it."

I think, there is here a hidden great mistake. The Natural Scientific Method "roughly adapted to that of perception and the imagination" is all rational at least in the final moment of its application, moreover as true that it allows exact statistic elaborations.

The base of the data collection can well lead to "the creation of a 'memory bank'" and its data are selected by the cognitive mechanisms of the identity for similarity (identity on the attribute), of opposition, and of a prelogical cause and effect relationship (The "post hoc, ergo propter hoc").

If it were otherwise, it raises one of more dramatic, or more ridiculous, consequences of this position. It is that the whole research of the same Lévi-Strauss is not scientific (it has not any experimental base) but it belongs only to the collection of anecdotes.

"Any classification is superior to chaos and even a classification at the level of sensible properties is a step towards rational ordering. It is legitimate, in classifying fruits into relatively heavy and relatively light, to begin by separating the apples from the pears even though shape, colour and taste are unconnected with weight and volume. This is because the larger apples are easier to distinguish from the smaller if the apples are not still mixed with fruit of different features. This example already shows that classification has its advantages even at the level of aesthetic perception."

We are dealing with arrangements done on the identity by similarity, or identity on the attribute, and, each, as Lévi-Strauss rightly writes, has its value by itself.

For the rest, and in spite of the fact that there is no "necessary connection between sensible qualities and properties",... "not all poisonous juices are burning or bitter nor is everything which is burning and bitter poisonous." Nevertheless, the hazardous statement that denies any "necessary connection between sensible qualities and properties," is in its turn soon contradicted by writing that "there is often at least an empirical connection between them, and the generalisation of this relation may be rewarding from the theoretical and practical point of view for a very long timr even if it has no foundation in reason."

"This operation has nothing of aesthetical (who knows then Lévi-Strauss does means with such adjective?) but "nature is so constituted that it is more advantageous if thought and action proceed as though this aesthetically satisfying equivalence also corresponded to objective reality."

This is exactly what often happens.

"There still exists among ourselves an activity, which on the technical plane gives us quite a good understanding of what a science we prefer to call 'prior' rather than 'primitive', could have been on the plane of speculation. This is what is commonly called 'bricolage' in French." (Lévi-Strauss, 1966)

Here, Lévi-Strauss want to suggest that the cognitive activity of the Neolithic man can be found again even today in the "bricolage." His idea runs for an elaborate and simplistic explanation, which kept a great deal for its flair.

Without any "bricolage" in the contemporary medicine even today we acquire still scientific results with the same not experimental but effective way, which the man of the Neolithic used. When the experiment is not feasible, and often it is so, we are not without any escape route, or we have to look out upon magic.

" I have already mentioned that the clinic, as the diagnosis of the single case, does not pertain to the experimental medicine, even if it was surely substantiated by it. Besides the clinic, the epidemiology too does not take part of it. Epidemiology is the sum of single cases concerning a population, even when it not succeeds to reach with safety the incidence level but simply that of the prevalence referred to the investigated sample.

On a short stop, I shall remember that the exit polls, for the forecast of electoral results, are a prevalence evaluation. They have their base on a limited population, but selected with the best criterion for representing the general population. Still a time, nothing to do with the experimental scientific method.

Till the end of the '70 in USA there was an absolute official refusal to accept the acupuncture as a scientific medical practice. So, although this one had over 3000 years of history and a doctrinal corpus much well established. They believed it as a singular placebo.

Only by the "sham acupuncture" (done by false points, outside the traditional points of the Chinese meridians) in subject used as controls, it has found that the acupuncture was and is an effective therapeutic technique. Its officially validation with the experimental scientific method did not absolutely change it for the better.

It worked already first and since a great deal of time, though its traditional theoretical explanation is still much debatable. However a thing is the result ( It works - it does not work) already computable (1 or 0), an other one is the related theoretical explanation ( It works because . . . ). This last depends on the knowledge level and of the world vision of historical time when it had it. An other thing still, finally, is its communication to other people, mainly to the medical colleagues.

In medicine something can work, and well too, even without that there is an explanation of because it does it. Since over one hundred years the acetyl-salicylicilate works, and it is only since about 20 years that we discovered at least one cause (It stimulates the prostaglandins).

Beyond the medicine, ours ancient progenitors reached several very scientific results (EG. selection and cultivation of the food plants; domestication of the animals) about 8500 years BC, in the area of the Fertile Crescent and in the Mediterranean coasts (Cocchi, 2004). "The Experimental Scientific Method, published by Galilean in 1632, was still far. On the other hand, the discovery of the Jove's satellites, made by the same Galileus, did not surely happen by using the Experimental Scientific Method. The Jove's satellites are still there, and their discovery was a truly scientific result.

To return to the medicine, great pharmaceutical firms finance explorations to tribes with poor or any contacts with our civilization, to know from the local medicine-men which are the curative plants used and for which troubles. They not only look for saving time and money in the research, which so will be already directed for taking the active substances out (Maxwell, 1990)

They give for asserting that we may have medical scientific knowledge discovered outside the Experimental Scientific Method."(Cocchi, 2004).

 

Conclusions.

The hypothesis of the so called "Neolithic paradox" as forwarded by the anthropologist Claude Lèvi-Strauss in his book "The Pensée Sauvage," comes out from an error of theoretical thinking, because he could not know how being free from the frame of scientism. This fact has prevented him to accept the existence of another, and more ancient Scientific Method, namely "the Natural Scientific Method."

According to the analysis of what this eminent anthropologist wrote about, it evidently appears his defect of right conceptualizing, even with an accurate description of the collected data. Two are the mistakes on it. 1. He did not know the Natural Scientific Method; 2. He had a false belief, as for the Scientific Method used in the Neolithic time to reach "mastery of the great arts of civilization - of pottery, weaving, agriculture and the domestication of animals" but the same has then been lost.

Too supposing clearly the presence of a Scientific Method as different from the Experimental Scientific Method, he could not to bring to theoretical conclusion what he had under his eyes. So, he "preferred" gets rid of the problem, by naming it as a paradox.

Unfortunately the true paradox is raised from this wrong conclusion of Lévi-Strauss, as such at all understandable, if not only justifiable in terms of scientism. By it, he derived his wrong conviction that the science progresses only through the Experimental Scientific Method.

 

References

AA.VV. Introduction to the Scientific Method and Astronomy. University of Rochcster. Rochester N.Y 1996 <www.teacher.nsrl.rochester.edu/phy_labs/ AppendixE/AppendixE.html>.

Cocchi R. Dominanza emisferica imperfetta e comportamenti cognitivi: Considerazioni speculative. Riv Ital Disturbo Intellet. 1994, 7: 55-61.

Cocchi R. Il metodo scientifico naturale nella medicina contemporanea. Lo Spallanzani 2004, 18: 31-36.<www.stress-cocchi.net/Speculation5-it.htm>

Lévi-Strauss C. La pensée sauvage. Plon, Parigi 1962 (Trad.it. Il pensiero selvaggio. Il Saggiatore, Milano, 1966).

Maxwell N. Witch doctors apprentice: Hunting for medicinal planis in the Amazonia. (3rd Edit.) Citadel Press 1990.

 Posted on internet on 24 October 2007. Copyright by Renato Cocchi 2007.

  

Author’s address:  Dr. Renato Cocchi, Via Rabbeno, 3

42100 Reggio Emilia

renatococchi@libero.it

  

Italian translation

Theoretical and research bases

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